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W o l f g a n g  K .  H .  P a n o f s k y
B E T W E E N  P H Y S I C S  A N D  P O L I T I C S  ―
O B S E R V A T I O N S  A N D  E X P E R I E N C E S  O F
A N  I N V O L V E D  P H Y S I C I S T
B e f o r e  p o l i t i c s
Ich bin ein Hamburger. My father with whose work you are well
acquainted left Berlin for Hamburg a few months after I  was
born. My father taught at this University from 1919 to 1934 and
established  the  Kunstgeschichtliches  Seminar.  I  received  my
school education here until age 15. At that time, before I gra-
duated from the  Gelehrtenschule  des  Johanneum,  my family
was forced to leave, and we settled in the United States. I stud-
ied physics with many experimental opportunities at Princeton
University  and then at  the California Institute of  Technology
where  I  received my doctorate  degree  in  1942.  By  that  time
World War II overtook most activities in basic science and I, like
most other American physicists, became involved in war work.
At Caltech, I worked on shockwave measurements from super-
sonic projectiles, but then it was agreed that I would assist the
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nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos in adapting the tech-
nology of shockwave measurements to determine the explosive
power of the nuclear weapons when tested or used. The devices
incorporated a condenser microphone directly controlling the
frequency of  a radio  transmitter.  I  participated in the Trinity
test, flying over the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo, New
Mexico.  Similar  to  most  young  participants  in  the  wartime
nuclear weapons program, I initially entertained no fundamen-
tal reflections on the implication of my involvement. Forty-five
million people died in World War II and ending the war seemed
an overriding priority at the time.
After the end of the war, I moved to the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley to help build the proton linear accelerator at
that institution and I carried out numerous experiments includ-
ing those  on the fundamental  properties  of  pi-mesons.  Since
then, my physics activities have concentrated on accelerator de-
sign and construction and using accelerators for experiments in
elementary particles physics. Our colleagues here at DESY are
fully  familiar  with  the  subsequent  developments  at  Stanford
University on linear accelerators followed by the establishment
of SLAC, the sister institution of DESY. 
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P o l i t i c s  i n  p h y s i c s  v e r s u s  p h y s i c s  i n  p o l i t i c s
Securing support for SLAC and later assuming responsibility
for its operation and research indeed involved many activities
‘between physics and politics.’ However, the discussion to fol-
low will focus on those interactions which relate to the input of
physics to politics in general, and to national security in par-
ticular, not to the support of physics by governmental agencies. 
While during my war work I paid little attention to the long
range implications of the new technologies, this changed with
the end of the conflict. The message imparted to me through the
work during the war induced me to maintain not only an inter-
est in military technology but also to become actively involved
in moderating the consequences of the new dramatic technical
developments. Initially, I gave public presentations to persuade
lay  audiences  that  nuclear  weapons  are  drastically  different
from other means of warfare; indeed they can increase the de-
structive power which can be carried by munitions of a given
size and weight by factors of over a million; and the effects, if
nuclear weapons are used, can be long-lasting. It has been diffi-
cult, particularly in recent times, for political leaders and citi-
zens to comprehend the enormous consequences of these physic-
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al facts. When numbers describing performance increase by a
large enough amount, they imply qualitative changes. 
Because fortunately, nuclear weapons have not been used for
over 60 years in combat since two ‘small’ nuclear weapons killed
a quarter of a million people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the
present generation of policy makers tends to treat nuclear weap-
ons as symbols of political strength or as components of natio-
nal prestige. Thus the awesome physical reality tends to be sub-
merged in policy deliberations, and this is a danger in itself.
Communicating  the  consequences  of  the  physical  reality  of
nuclear weapons is a responsibility which I have attempted to
undertake ever since. Thus I became a ‘double hatted’ individu-
al:  pursuing basic physics while interacting with the political
leadership in the United States and getting involved in discus-
sions with representatives of other countries. 
O f f e n s e  v e r s u s  d e f e n s e  i n  t h e  n u c l e a r  a g e
My first such experience was in a committee of the Scientific
Advisory Board of the U.S. Air Force dealing with the vulner-
ability of the United States to nuclear weapons. That experience
led to my conviction that the balance between offense and de-
fense in the nuclear age has changed drastically: since a single
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nuclear  weapon can kill  on  the  order  of  one  million  people
when detonated in a metropolitan area, an active defense must
achieve almost 100 % intercept to be effective. In more quantita-
tive terms, if defenses are deployed at a certain cost in order to
decrease the vulnerability of a country or some of its installa-
tions, then the offense can in almost all cases augment its power
at a cost much less than that of the defense and leave the vulner-
ability just as high. In other words, in the nuclear age, defenses
will generally escalate the levels of armaments without decreas-
ing  the  real  vulnerability  of  society.  This  general  conclusion,
which can of course be supported by detailed analysis for specif-
ic weapons systems, is difficult to convey to policy makers, and
the issue of offense versus defense continues to resurface over
and over again. I have often introduced the technical realities of
the offense-defense situation into high-level discussions, includ-
ing in Congressional testimony.
N u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  t e s t i n g
Then came the effort to stop nuclear weapons testing, an effort
strongly supported by President Eisenhower. The President had
the idealistic concept that scientific discussion and political dis-
cussions could be separated in the international discourse. This
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implied that scientists who were citizens of countries of adver-
sary interest could get together and reach objective conclusions
which could then lay the foundation of subsequent political ne-
gotiations.  This  basic  concept  led  to  the  “Conference  of
Experts” in 1958, followed by two Technical Working Groups;
the participants  in  these  negotiations  were physical  scientists
from the two countries charged with establishing the principles
to underlie a control system designed to verify a negotiated ces-
sation of nuclear weapons tests. I participated in the two technic-
al  Working  Groups,  including  serving as  chair  of  the  group
charged with examining the possibilities of monitoring nuclear
weapons tests conducted in outer space. 
These negotiations demonstrated that the idealistic concept
of  separating  physics  and  politics  did  not  work  in  the  real
world. While the charge to the Technical Working Groups did
not  include  the  design  of  a  control  system,  the  implications
were clear: the Soviet interest was to make it appear that verifi-
cation of a nuclear test cessation treaty would be easy because
in that case, the intrusiveness of a potential inspection system
would be less.  As a result,  the disagreements between Soviet
and American scientists were always in the same direction, re-
flecting the political  interests of their  respective governments.
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We were able to break this bias at times but it kept resurfacing
throughout the negotiations.  Nevertheless agreement on final
reports was reached resulting from these negotiations among
scientists. 
S c i e n c e  i n p u t  t o  s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y
Subsequent to this ‘baptism of fire’ into the political implications
of technical reality, I participated in the national security work of
the President’s  Science Advisory Committee  which was estab-
lished through Eisenhower’s initiative. In that role, the Com-
mittee had frequent occasion to dampen projected military ‘re-
quirements’ in moderating the excessive projections as to  what
technological developments could do in the military sphere. In
fact,  this experience made it clear that scientific advice to the
highest levels of government is absolutely essential  if  excesses
and outright mistakes are to be avoided which would be the
case if  scientific  advice was filtered through the objectives of
lower-level governmental departments. I am greatly honored to
participate in the opening of the Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker
Center for Science and Peace Research, and I hope that this Cen-
ter will be instrumental in generating scientific input related to
International Security to the highest levels of policy makers.
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Notwithstanding the  demonstrated usefulness  of  scientific
advice at the highest governmental level on matters of military
security, the voice of Science in reaching the top decision mak-
ers  has been progressively  muted over  subsequent  American
administrations; the extent to which such scientific input can be
available to policy makers in other countries is highly variable.
It is essential that such communication be strengthened and that
channels be open and unbiased in reaching the highest levels. A
younger generation of independent scientists must become ac-
quainted and experienced in matters of national security in ord-
er to make such communication credible.  Towards that end I
joined in the work of the JASON group whose membership is
recruited from academics who are willing to work on national
security issues interspersed with their regular academic activ-
ities, and which continues to acquire younger participants. JA-
SON has been highly successful in diversifying its interests by
attracting biological weapon talent and in inspiring a younger
generation of members. 
I played a leading role in establishing and working with the
Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences. That standing committee of
the Academy is composed of natural and social scientists and
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retired military officers. It forms a bridge to similar bodies of
other countries,  even during the depths of the Cold War and
other periods of tension.
N u c l e a r  w e a p o n s :  d a n g e r s  a n d  c o n t r o l
Let me now reflect on how these past experiences relate to some
of the current threats posed by nuclear weapons. Throughout the
Cold war,  nuclear  weapons served  primarily to  deter  direct
armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States
and in retrospect they probably succeeded in doing so. How-
ever, deterrence had a large variety of interpretations. In general,
deterrence implies to hold those assets of the opponent at risk
which he values to a degree sufficient to persuade him that ini-
tiation of hostilities followed by retaliation would result in an
unacceptable loss. But what is to be held at risk? And what is to
be done if deterrence fails? Since these two questions do not
have  clear  answers,  successive  political  leaders  both  in  the
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  diversified  the  missions
which nuclear weapons were to accomplish. 
Immediately after World War II, the United States’ military
leaders deployed nuclear weapons mainly for punitive exten-
sive anti-population attacks, while scientists advised to pursue
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more  limited  objectives.  Over  time  these  positions  reversed.
Some military leaders maintained that ‘nuclear war fighting’ at
a variety of levels of nuclear violence would be possible, and
that if war broke out, the West should prevail in a protracted
nuclear exchange. In turn, most scientists advised that such a
course would lead to  escalation with devastating results  and
that ‘finite’ or even ‘minimum’ deterrence without anticipating
actual military use of nuclear weapons would be a prudent ap-
proach.  At the same time,  most military doctrines supported
‘extended deterrence,’ that is, not only deterring a nuclear at-
tack by others but also using nuclear weapons to deter a variety
of non-nuclear aggressive moves. In particular, American and
NATO doctrine largely promoted the role of nuclear weapons
in compensating for the perceived inferiority of NATO conven-
tional  forces  during  the  Cold  War  in  Europe,  thereby  using
nuclear weapons to deter conventional aggression by the Soviet
Union.  As  a  remnant  of  that  policy  about  500  United  States
nuclear  weapons  are  still  based  on  aircraft  in  Europe  today,
principally in Germany. This makes the U. S. the only nuclear
weapons state known to base nuclear weapons abroad.
These ambiguities or varieties of deterrence concepts when
translated into military requirements led both the Soviet Union
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and the United States to what I consider an insane build-up of
nuclear weapons which peaked at a total of about 70,000 weap-
ons during the Cold War. That number has now shrunk to some-
what below 30,000 warheads ‒ still a vastly excessive and dan-
gerous number; a substantial number of nuclear weapons re-
main on ‘hair trigger’ alert, increasing the risk of a nuclear re-
lease  through failure  of  correct  communication and control.
This  build-up was  counteracted by  negotiated  arms  control
efforts in which I extensively participated, but which are now
being  deemphasized  and  replaced  by  more  limited  arrange-
ments. The latest such agreement is the Moscow Treaty of May
2002 signed by the United States and Russia. That Treaty has
little substance; there are no verification provisions; it is limited
only to operationally deployed strategic warheads which con-
stitute only a minority of the nuclear warheads owned by Rus-
sia and the U. S. Moreover, the Treaty has no time-table for its
implementation; the planned reductions must be reached only
at the date of expiration, the year 2012, of the Treaty. The agreed
limitations in the previous Treaty, START II,  have been aban-
doned  and  the  U.  S.  has  withdrawn  from  the  Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. So the Arms Control Process is in urgent need of
revival and strengthening.
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T h e  m i s s i o n  o f  n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  
a f t e r  t h e  C o l d  W a r
But now the Cold War is over and we must squarely face the
question “what are nuclear weapons for?” Nuclear dangers re-
main in several categories distinct from those faced during the
Cold War. First, there is the danger that release of nuclear weap-
ons might be triggered by erroneous information or miscalcula-
tion or because of lack of control. Then there is the danger that
nuclear weapons might be deliberately used in regional conflict
such as that between Pakistan and India. Third, there is the risk
that nuclear weapons or the material to make them fall into the
hands of non-state actors which might then lead to a terrorist
detonation of one or a small number of nuclear weapons in a
populated area.  And then finally,  there is  the risk of  nuclear
proliferation which if it became more extensive might prove un-
controllable.
The United States  and the other  states  possessing nuclear
weapons have,  in  my view, failed to  critically  reexamine the
mission of nuclear weapons responding to these vastly changed
circumstances. The nuclear weapons states are facing many is-
sues in managing their nuclear arsenals. I have participated in
the recent debates in the United States on the technical factors
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relating to using nuclear weapons to attack underground tar-
gets, on the best way to maintain a reliable and safe, but aging,
stockpile and on infrastructure and personnel issues affecting
the  nuclear  weapons  program.  But  addressing  such  issues
would be enormously eased if a clear and restricted mission for
nuclear weapons were agreed on. 
Notwithstanding the convoluted arguments in the nuclear po-
sture reviews and other documents promulgated by the United
States, the nuclear weapons stockpiles as now deployed, while
diminished, are still in essence a heritage of the Cold War. The
effort  to  stem  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  that  is
enshrined in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which
came into force in 1970, and was changed to an agreement of in-
definite duration in 1995, is now under severe stress. The NPT
was intended to be a balanced bargain between nuclear weap-
ons states and non-nuclear weapons states: the non-nuclear wea-
pons states are obligated not to acquire nuclear weapons and
the  nuclear  weapons states  are  required not to  transfer  such
weapons or the means to make them to non-nuclear weapons
states. To balance this discriminatory aspect of the Treaty, non-
nuclear weapons states  are given the inalienable right  to  de-
velop nuclear energy for  peaceful  purposes,  and at the same
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time, nuclear weapons states must in good faith pursue steps to
reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. While no time scale is
provided towards this end, the Treaty clearly requires the de-
emphasis of nuclear weapons in international relations. 
In addressing ‘between physics and politics,’ we must be re-
minded  that  stemming the  spread  of  new technical  achieve-
ments which might serve destructive purposes over the entire
globe has never succeeded in the past of human history. Thus,
successful measures to prevent proliferation cannot follow tra-
ditional  political  lines.  A system  designed  to  preserve  inde-
finitely a division among the world’s nations between the haves
and have-nots in respect to nuclear weapons cannot endure for
long.  Nuclear  weapons  are  the  ‘great  equalizer’ between the
now most powerful nations and the lesser states. Thus the lead-
ing nations should have the strongest motives to reduce the role
of  nuclear  weapons.  Non-Nuclear  Weapons  States  must  be
persuaded that their National Interest and Security are better
served without nuclear weapons than with them. On the long
run, this is only possible if the nuclear weapons states take lead-
ership in diminishing the prominence of  military force or  the
threat of military force in their international relations.
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In this situation, I maintain that the only justifiable residual
mission for nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weap-
ons by others. Such a restricted purpose is equivalent to a no-
first-use doctrine in respect to nuclear weapons. Yet, among the
current possessors of nuclear weapons, including the five official
nuclear states under the NPT and India, Pakistan and Israel, only
China has adopted such a doctrine. In my view, the United States,
as the most powerful of nations measured by conventional arma-
ments  should  take  leadership  in  promoting  such  a  restricted
mission of nuclear weapons. Failing such leadership, it will be-
come increasingly more difficult to answer the question: if  the
United States with its uniquely powerful non-nuclear arsenal still
needs nuclear weapons, why should lesser nations not require
them in the interest of their security?
If the mission of nuclear weapons is restricted to the only
function of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others, then
the number of nuclear weapons required for that purpose be-
comes very small, much smaller than those in the arsenals of the
United States and Russia today. Such reduced numbers would
go a long way in limiting the damage which might accrue in
case of  inadvertent use and the smaller  stockpiles  of  nuclear
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weapons and the materials to make them would be much easier
to protect against diversion to terrorists.
Science and Politics need one another, but scientific realities
cannot be coerced by policy. As a physicist, I agree that nuclear
weapons cannot  be uninvented,  but  once  their  function is  re-
duced as indicated, then the path is eased to their eventual prohib-
ition. I note that prohibition has now been achieved for chemical
and biological weapons, but prohibition and elimination are not
identical; evasion on a small scale of a prohibition which might
be undetected is still  feasible. But reducing the role of nuclear
weapons to the single function of deterring their use is a neces-
sity if their spread across the globe is to be inhibited, if the other
nuclear dangers are to be contained, and if the damage which
nuclear weapons can cause is to be minimized. We can do no less.
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